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A JAB TO THE WEST, A JAB TO THE EAST

One of the most cited results of the previous survey conducted in June became the answers to the question “If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?” 14.2% of respondents answered that they would resist up in arms, 47.7% of respondents would try to adapt to new situation and 16.5% of respondents would even greet such changes.
In light of events in the East of Ukraine these figures are not very inspiring. These events weren’t over in September, when this question was asked in a slightly different form (Table 1).

 

September survey openly asked about an armed seizure, while in June respondents could suppose that we asked him about a reaction on a possible referendum about annexation of Belarus or its part by Russia. Moreover, three month ago the question was asked about a complete action (“annexed”), while in September the question was about an attempt (“tried to annex”). That is why formulation could have influenced the answers.
What else could influence the answers? Respondents’ perception of events in Ukraine and projection of their results on the destiny of own country certainly could do it. It is evident, that the share of those who are ready to protect Motherland from an invasion from the East increased significantly. Now it is almost twice as high as the share of those for whom Russian soldiers would be “friends”.
Possibly, the cruelty of war in Donbass and repeated statements of politicians (beginning with the President) about readiness to fight for homeland somewhat aroused Belarusians’ patriotism and intensified their readiness to protect their country.
It is interesting to note that answers on a similar question about an armed invasion from the West turned out to be very similar (Table 2).

 

Here the shares of people ready to resist up in arms and people ready to adapt are almost equal to the according shares from Table 1. The share of those who are ready to greet an armed invasion from the West is almost the same as the share of those who would happily greed the “guests” from the East.
Taking into account the deep ideological split in Belarusian society, which is in no small part due to geopolitical choice, one could suppose that people ready to resist up in arms with an invasion from one side wouldn’t at least object to “liberators” from another side. And vice versa. However this supposition can be confirmed only partly (Table 3).
Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question on possible military invasions from Russia and NATO*, %
If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?
If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?
I’d resist up in arms
I’d try to adapt to a new situation
I’d greet these changes
DA/NA
I’d resist up in arms
14.2
3.1
6.0
2.6
I’d try to adapt to a new situation
5.3
26.7
2.0
5.8
I’d greet these changes
3.0
7.6
0.9
1.9
DA/NA
3.5
2.8
0.9
14.1
* Data in the table are absolute percents from the whole sample
It’s easy to see that a significant part of respondents (14.2%) – which is almost each seventh – is ready for an armed resistance to an invasion of both Russian and NATO troops. This setup coincides with the statements of President A. Lukashenko on protection from attack wherever they would come from. This patriotic spirit of the head of state is shared by quite a part of Belarusians. But a much bigger part of them (26.7%) is similarly consistent in their readiness to adapt to any trouble of a kind.
It is interesting to note the asymmetry of Table 3: more than a half (7.6%) of those who would greet armed annexation of Belarus to Russia (13.3%) would also try to adapt to the results of a Western intervention; at the same time almost two thirds (6%) of those who would greet results of a NATO operation (9.7%) would resist Russian aggression up in arms.
Table 4 demonstrates how certain reactions to a hypothetical foreign intervention are connected to political preferences.
Table 4. Connection between the answers on behavior under the condition of a foreign military intervention, socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences*, %
Characteristics
If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?
If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?
I’d resist up in arms
I’d try to adapt to a new situation
I’d greet these changes
I’d resist up in arms
I’d try to adapt to a new situation
I’d greet these changes
Age:
18-29
33.2
39.0
9.2
25.6
39.1
16.7
30-59
27.6
41.5
9.3
27.6
37.0
9.9
60+
14.3
36.3
27.1
22.6
47.9
2.3
Do you trust the President?
Trust
21.3
37.3
17.4
30.2
38.9
2.5
Don’t trust
34.7
39.1
10.0
19.0
40.7
22.8
Do you consider yourself closer to Russians or Europeans?
Russians
20.2
42.3
16.4
30.1
42.4
2.9
Europeans
42.4
33.0
4.5
14.6
33.9
29.2
If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?
Integration with the RF
17.8
41.2
23.4
33.6
42.9
2.0
Joining the EU
41.5
35.9
5.2
16.0
37.6
26.1
DA/NA
20.2
42.3
2.9
23.8
37.3
1.9
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely objective/ Mostly objective
17.1
43.6
18.5
28.1
44.7
2.1
Completely biased/Mostly biased
40.2
35.1
7.9
26.0
35.8
19.2
How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?
It’s a crime, a war against their own people
19.7
42.8
17.1
30.8
43.2
3.6
It’s a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion
43.0
31.8
12.3
19.3
38.7
29.8
It’s a severe, but a forced measure
38.8
34.6
4.2
19.2
34.3
17.5
Some people in Russia think that Russia must send their troops to help the participants of armed protests in the East of Ukraine. What’s your attitude to it?
Negative
28.5
39.6
10.0
25.4
41.1
11.3
Positive
26.2
24.3
32.4
40.8
31.3
5.2
Indifferent
24.8
50.3
10.7
20.6
44.9
12.7
* The table is read across
Young people would to a greater extent resist an attack from the East and to a lesser extent – from the West. Nevertheless, different age groups would fight Western “guests” with almost the same involvement, while readiness to fight with the East depends on age to a much greater extent.
Attitude to the President quite significantly influences respondents’ readiness to rebuff the invaders: those who trust him are inclined to fight with Western aggressors; those who don’t trust him would better fight against the East. Cultural self-identification and geopolitical preferences turn out to be even more differentiating factors. Readiness to resist up in arms to an invasion from “strangers” is twice as high as readiness to fight with “friends”. But it is also notable that quite a big part of respondents’ in corresponding groups are ready to resist “friends” as well.
It is typical that in group of those who refuse to make a geopolitical choice between the RF and the EU the number of those who are ready to greet the consequences of both Russian and NATO intervention is minimal.
Respondents’ evaluations of objectivity of Russian TV influence their intentions to almost the same extent. This influence, however, mostly applies to the hypothetical answer to a Russian invasion; as for a hypothetical NATO intervention, both those who trust Russian TV and those who don’t are equally ready to resist a Western invasion.
At first sight it may seem that consent with the opinion that Russia must send their troops to Ukraine should significantly influence unwillingness to resist these troops if they come to Belarus. However, there is no direct connection. People who think that Russia should battle in Ukraine don’t think that Russian army forces are good for everyone.
As you may see from Tables 3 and 4 militarily Belarusians are not very inclined to equate their interests with one or another military force. Probably that is the reason for little popularity of ideas of military collaboration with the RF or NATO (Table 5).

 

Despite the sharpening of the conflict in the East of Ukraine, despite lots of bloodshed there over the last three month, Belarusians’ wish to hide from such threats under the “umbrella” of NATO didn’t increase, but decreased. On the other hand plans of hosting Russian airbase in the country haven’t met great support as well: there are twice as much of opponents of this idea as of adherents (Table 6).

 

In fine we may say that Belarusians are equally (but not very strongly) inclined to resist up in arms to a foreign armed invasion both from the West and from the East. A considerable share of them (almost each seventh) is ready to resist a military intervention wherever it would come from. However, cultural self-identification and geopolitical preferences quite significantly influence their behavior: respondent are less inclined to resist a hypothetical intervention from geopolitical and cultural “friends” and more inclined to greet them.