«

»

DONBASS AND THE BONES OF A BELARUSIAN SOLDIER

The fact that all of the sides of Ukrainian conflict chose Belarus for hosting the negotiations is, on top of everything else, an acknowledgement of political talents of the Belarusian President. In this complicated and dangerous situation he has managed (at least, as for today) to rest on good terms with almost all of the direct and indirect participants of the conflict.
And how do Belarusians perceive his policy towards Ukraine? His gestures in favor of Moscow and Kiev during the whole conflict can be listed endlessly. But what is the resultant force of all these maneuvers in the mass consciousness?
Only few respondents think that he supports Kiev in this conflict (Table 1). The number of those, who think, that he acts completely in the course of Moscow policy, is 6-fold higher. Still the former and the latter constitute only an insignificant minority in comparison with those who think that he doesn’t equate his policy with neither of opposing parties.

 

As September survey shows an imposing majority of Belarusians share Russia’s position on Ukraine. Table 1 testifies that majority thinks that the head of Belarusian state doesn’t share this position. So how does the majority evaluate this Lukashenko’s policy?
An imposing preponderance of positive evaluations is evident (Table 2). It should be noted that the total share of positive evaluations (14.8%+44.7%=59.5%) exceeds both A. Lukashenko’s electoral rating (45.2%) and his trust rating (53.5%).

 

Table 3 demonstrates this paradox even more brightly.
Table 3. Dependency of evaluations of President A. Lukashenko’s policy towards the crisis in Ukraine on socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences, %
Characteristics
According to you, what is President A. Lukashenko’s policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?
How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko’s policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?
He completely supports the policy of Russian power
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties/maintains neutrality
Unambiguously positively/Rather positively
Negatively/Rather negatively
Age:
18-29
22.1
3.2
64.9
48.3
34.5
30-59
18.0
2.5
72.7
58.5
28.3
60 +
14.6
2.6
76.8
73.1
15.7
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely objective/ Mostly objective
17.8
2.9
73.8
77.8
12.0
Completely biased/Mostly biased
20.2
3.0
71.2
36.3
49.3
How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?
It’s a crime, a war against their own people
16.2
2.2
76.1
68.5
20.7
It’s a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion
28.3
6.1
55.6
30.0
55.6
It’s a severe, but a forced measure
21.3
2.4
68.9
48.4
32.4
Do you agree with the definition of participants of armed riots in the east of Ukraine as “terrorists”?
Yes
24.6
2.7
67.0
43.4
40.9
No
15.6
2.8
74.8
68.0
21.1
Do you agree with the definition of the Ukrainian power, which was installed after Yanukovich’s overthrow, as “fascists”?
Yes
16.0
2.2
76.1
66.8
23.0
No
23.3
3.1
64.0
46.2
37.9
The negotiations between representatives of Ukrainian powers and participants of armed protests in the East of Ukraine were held in Minsk in the end of July. How do you evaluate the fact that Belarus provided ground for these negotiations?
Negatively, there should be no negotiations with terrorists
25.8
5.9
64.5
29.9
61.0
Negatively, there should be no negotiations with the fascist junta
20.1
5.7
67.8
45.4
46.0
Positively
18.0
2.0
75.4
73.3
17.0
If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?
Integration with the RF
16.7
2.9
74.1
69.7
18.8
Joining the EU
25.7
2.9
63.7
39.8
46.1
A clear connection in the answers to all questions of Table 3 can be observed: the bigger the share of those who think that A. Lukashenko’s policy towards Ukraine coincides with Russian position, the lower evaluations of this policy are. This is true for every group.
This is natural for the groups whose political preferences define them as opposition. For opposition proximity of official Minsk’s position to the position of Kremlin is an evident drawback, even a betrayal of interest of Belarusian people. For many of these people talking about pro-Russianism of A. Lukashenko is another way to express their negative attitude to him.
What’s more interesting is the character of this connection in groups with opposite political preferences. Sharing Russian position in their evaluations of events in Ukraine, they think that A. Lukashenko’s position is the same not more often, but even more rare than respondents in an average selection. Nevertheless, they approve this policy, although it doesn’t coincide with their preferences.
As it was noted earlier (see Ukrainian Compass for Geopolitical Poles of Belarus) there is a mismatch between ideological, practical end existential levels in Belarusians’ evaluations of events in Ukraine. Supporters of Russian position approve it on the ideological level. However on both practical and existential levels they are not so reckless in their support of separatists and Russia. “We are for it, but without us” – this is a brief characteristic of their position.
For oppositional respondents both Kremlin and Minsk power “cats” are “grey”: the fact that Kremlin calls Ukrainian power “junta”, and A. Lukashenko politely communicates with P. Poroshenko and his revolutionary predecessors doesn’t mean a thing for these respondents. Their benchmark is the position of Kiev. They compare the position of Minsk to it and draw the conclusion that there is no unambiguous support as in case with Western countries. So if Minsk does not Kiev, it supports Moscow. This logic, as you can see, is valid not for all respondents from this group, but for the majority it is.
A completely different logic, an opposite one to a certain extent, is proper for another part of respondents – those, for whom the benchmark is the Moscow position. They see that A. Lukashenko’s position doesn’t coincide with the Kremlin one. For them it is slightly upsetting, but not very much, because ideological setup doesn’t invade practical and existential levels.
Otto von Bismarck once said: “The Balkans are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier”. Paraphrasing him we may describe these people’s setup as follows: “All Donbass (and probably all Ukraine) is not worth healthy bones of a single Belarusian soldier”.
Probably for someone’s liking that sounds awfully cynical. Nevertheless this pragmatic reticence of the great chancellor greatly contributed to the peace in Europe. By the way, he never said that Germany didn’t have interests in the Balkans or that Russia’s activity in the region pleased him a great deal. He recognized the interests and he was troubled by Saint-Petersburg’s actions and plans for Constantinople. However he had a clear understanding of the price. Bismarck’s successors preferred an ideological, “moral” approach. It resulted in the First World War.
When Maira Mora, the EU ambassador to Belarus, urged Belarusians to support their president in his peaceful policy, she was probably aware of real alternatives. Belarus conducting policy in the Ukrainian question resembling policy of the EU-countries, may only be in dreams. A real alternative, based in particular on social moods, comprises Minsk copying all the actions, gestures and ideologemes of Moscow.